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be "in the interest of justice," encompasses far more than the criterion of
convenience, and therefore prevents the escape of the defendant to a juris-
diction in which the plaintiff cannot afford to sue.4' And where the court
grants transfer to a forum in which the plaintiff can afford to sue, the de-
fendant cannot hide behind jurisdictional barriers since a prerequisite to
transfer is another available forum. Nor is the plaintiff subject to any de-
lay if he selects the convenient forum as original venue.42 Thus the new trans-
fer provision of the Judicial Code, while protecting antitrust defendants from
an harassing and vexatious choice of venue, still permits protection of the
penniless private litigant from the evading tactics of a wealthy, well-repre-
sented corporate defendant.
COUNTERCLAIM FOR MALICIOUS PROSECUTION IN THE
ACTION ALLEGED TO BE MALICIOUS:'
IN an original action for malicious prosecution the plaintiff must allege
and prove the termination in his favor of a prior suit instituted maliciously
and without probable cause; I failure to allege the favorable termination of
such a suit has uniformly been held to justify dismissal of the complaint.'
have specifically applied the tests established in the Gull Oil case. Ferguson v. Ford Motor
Co., 77 F. Supp. 425 (S.D. N.Y. 1948) (antitrust treble damage suit, motion denied); SEC
v. Wimer, 75 F. Supp. 955 (W.D. Pa. 1948) (SEC action, motion denied); Di Lella v,
Lehigh Valley K-R., 7 F.R.D. 192 (S.D.N.Y. 1947) (negligence action, motion denied).
41. It seems logical for courts to find that the "interest of justice" is not served by
transferring a case beyond the reach of an impecunious plaintiff. Thus there seems little
basis for the apprehension expressed in Note, 34 VA. L. REv. 811, 821 (1948), that
§ 1404(a) will discourage the bringing of suits by such plaintiffs.
42. The delay involved in the filing and hearing of a motion to transfer, without ap-
peal (see note 33 supra), will be short by its very nature. Furthermore, defendants failing
to consolidate their motion to transfer with other pre-trial motions under FED, R. Civ. P.
12(g) can well expect that the court will discredit their motives in the absence of a good
reason for the lateness in making the motion.
* Herendeen v. Ley Realty Co., 75 N.Y. S. 2d 836 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
1. The elements of the cause of action are the same whether the prior suit be criminal
or civil, the essence of the action being malice and lack of probable cause. Burt v. Smith,
181 N.Y. 1, 73 N.E. 495 (1905); Kolka v. Jones, 6 N.D. 461, 71 N.W. 558 (1897); Glenn v.
Lawrence, 280 Ill. 581, 117 N.E. 757 (1917). For a general treatment of the subject of
malicious prosecution, see HARPER, LAW OF TORTS §§ 268-271 (1933); PROSSER, TORTS §§
96,97 (1941).
2. Weber v. Strobel, 225 S.W. 925 (Mo. 1920); Martin v. Cedar Lake Ice Co., 145
Minn. 452, 177 N.W. 631 (1920). Actions for malicious prosecution, filed before the fa-
vorable termination of the suit alleged to be malicious, have been dismissed even though the
suit had so terminated by the time of trial. Huffman v. Meriwether, 201 S.W. 2d 469 (Mo.
App. 1947).
Authorities differ as to what constitutes termination of a civil suit, but the most general
requirement is that the particular action be invulnerable to renewal. Graves v. Scott, 104
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On this ground, counterclaims of malicious prosecution when brought in
the action alleged to be malicious similarly have been dismissed.3 A recent
New York ruling, however, reaches a contrary result.4 The reasons for re-
quiring an allegation of favorable termination, the court holds, are inappli-
cable to such a counterclaim.
The reasons for the favorable termination rule are clear. Termination of
the prior suit removes the possibility of conflicting judgments should the
plaintiff win the action for malicious prosecution and, subsequently, lose the
original litigation. An unfavorable termination of the prior suit, moreover,
establishes probable cause and bars a subsequent action for malicious
prosecution.-
But an action for malicious prosecution filed as a counterclaim to the
complaint in the particular suit alleged to be malicious entails no danger of
confficting judgments. And a court may order the issues peculiar to the
counterclaim 6 to be tried only after the favorable termination of a trial on
the issues raised by the complaint 7 The ruling of the New York court,
Va. 372, 51 S.E. 821 (1905); Apgar v. Woolston, 43 N.J.L. 57 (1881). Malicious prosecution
will not lie if the prior suit was terminated by compromise. Nelson v. National Casualty Co.,
179 Minn. 53, 228 N.W. 437 (1929).
3. U.S. Tire Co. v. Kirk, 102 Kan. 418, 170 Pac. S11 (1918); Cawker City State Ban:
v. Jennings, 89 Iowa 230, 56 N.W. 494 (1893); Niedringhaus v. Zucker, 203 S.V.2d 211,
(Mo. 1948); Friedman v. Roseth Corp., 190 Misc. 742, 74 N.Y.S.2d 733 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
There appear to be no cases contra. Even where the plaintiff was a nonresident and dis-
missal of the counterclaim might deny the defendant all opportunity to pursue the action
further, the counterclaim was held demurrable for lack of termination of the prior suit.
Central Acceptance Corp. v. Rachal, 264 Ky. 849,95 SAV. 2d 777 (1936).
4. Herendeen v. Ley Realty Co, 75 N.Y.S. 2d 836 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
5. No action for malicious prosecution can, of course, be based on procesdings which
turn out to have been justified. See cases cited in Note, 69 A.L.R. 1062 (1930). Judgement
for the plaintiff in the original civil action is usually conclusive of probable cause, even if
reversed on appeal. Crescent City Livestock Co. v. Butchers' Union Slaughter-House Co.,
120 U.S. 141 (1887); Clements v. Odorless Excavating Apparatus Co., 67 Md. 461, 605, 10
Atl. 442, 13 Adt. 632 (1887). There is an exception in the case of a judgment fraudulently
obtained. See cases cited in Note, 97 A.L.R. 1022 (1935). And favorable termination of the
prior action need not be shown if it is one at which no opportunity v,as granted to contest
the facts. Lanterman v. Delaw.are, L.&W. R. Co., 229 F. 770 (D. N.J. 1916).
6. Peculiar to the counterclaim are the issues of malice and absence of probable cause.
Although evidence of absence of probable cause necessarily involves most of the facts
relevant to the issues of the complaint, it also involves additional facts relevant to the reason-
ableness of the plaintiff's belief that he had a good cause of action. Stev-art v. Sonneborn,
98 U.S. 187 (1878).
7. Modern codes with liberal counterclaim provisions are equally liberal in permitting
the court to order separate trial of the counterclaim issues, if necessary. FED. R. Civ. P.,
42 (b); N.Y. Crv. Pn~c. AcT § 262 (1939).
The issues irrelevant to the complaint in a counterclaim for malicious prosecution,
should be tried separately. Were the issues of the complaint and counterclaim to be tried
together, the danger edsts that evidence of malice might prejudice the plaintiff's claim.
Furthermore, should the plaintiff's claim fail, a court or jury which had heard all of the
evidence at one time might be inclined to sustain the counterclaim as a matter of course.
Yet the mere failure of the complaint under such circumstances should not in itself ba evi-
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therefore, while it does not go so far as to permit the counterclaimant to cry
before he is hurt,$ does allow him to complain before it is certain whether
there is anyone to blame but himself. The counterclaim will not progress
beyond the pleading stage, however, unless a successful determination of
this issue gives the cause of action the matured status which would permit a
separate suit.9
The New York ruling affords to the court and the respective parties an
opportunity to dispose of an entire controversy in one action. Applied gen-
erally, it might produce other less desirable consequences.
Particularly in jurisdictions where an action for malicious prosecution
may be based on almost any civil action 10 and where relatively liberal provi-
dence of a lack of probable cause in bringing the suit. Barton v. Woodward, 32 Idaho 375,
182 Pac. 916 (1919).
8. Most of the damages which the counterclaimant hopes to recover have been in-
curred before the filing of the counterclaim. Facile analogy to a person "about to be hit by
a recklessly driven car," see Note, 25 Ky. L.J. 375 (1937), is, therefore, inaccurate, The
defendant has been "hit," and the issue is the recklessness.
9. The New York court, seeking to surmount the metaphysical objection that a cause
of action must be in existence when asserted, reasons that ". . . it is the malicious pros-
ecution itself, and not the determination that the prosecution is malicious [and without
probable cause?], which gives rise to the cause of action." 75 N.Y.S.2d 836, 838 (1947).
Of course, an actual determination that the prior suit was malicious is not a prerequisite to
the assertion of a valid cause of action as of the time a complaint or counterclaim asserting
that cause of action is filed. But, at least heretofore, the actual favorable termination of the
prior suit has been such a prerequisite. Since both malice and absence of probable cause are
clearly essential to a successful cause of action for malicious prosecution, the court probably
means no more than that the cause of action, if it can be established by subsequent proof of
the facts necessary to sustain it, arises at the time the malicious complaint is filed. In effect,
the court eliminates the favorable termination of the malicious suit as an essential element
in the cause of action, though retaining it as a prerequisite to establishing absence of probable
cause. But this reasoning taken alone would also permit a separate complaint, as well as
a counterclaim, for malicious prosecution, to be filed before the termination of the allegedly
malicious suit. It is probable, however, that the court would not follow its rationale to this
conclusion; for to permit a separate claim pending disposition of the original proceeding
entails no procedural advantage.
The court further suggests that its reasoning is supported by legislation, N.Y. Civ.
PRAc. AcT §§ 266, 245-a, 245-b (1939), abolishing the requirement that a counterclaim
state a cause of action in existence at the time the complaint is filed. 75 N.Y.S, 2d 836, 838
(1947). But these legislative provisions do not waive the requirement that a counterclaim
state a cause of action, nor any requirement that the cause of action be in existence at the
time the counterclaim itself is filed. And similar legislation, Mo. R.S.A. § 847.73 (Supp.
1948), has been held of no avail for counter-claims for malicious prosecution. Niedringhasn
v. Zucker, 208 S.W.2d 211 (Mo. 1948).
10. Many jurisdictions have been reluctant to permit malicious prosecution to be
brought for an ordinary civil suit, though a majority now do, and the remainder apparently
allow the remedy when the civil suit involved interference with person or property, or when
there was a series of harassing suits. Kolka v. Jones, 6. N.D. 461, 71 N.W. 558 (1897).
Closson v. Staples, 42 Vt. 209, 1 Am. Rep. 316 (1869) (any civil action); Paul v. Fargo, 84
App. Div. 9, 82 N.Y.Supp. 369 (4th Dep't. 1903), Martin v. Rexford, 170 N.C. 540, 87
S.E. 352 (1915) (interference with person or property); Shedd v. Patterson, 302 IU. 355,
134 N.E. 705 (1922), Pangburn v. Bull, 1 Wend. 345 (N.Y. 1828) (successive suits).
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sion is made for counterclaims, 11 a general application of the New York
ruling might inhibit the litigation of bona fide claims. To file a counterclaim
requires neither the time, the expense, nor the preparation required for the
institution of a separate suit. More important, under the New York ruling,
a counterclaim for malicious prosecution may be filed where an unfavorable
termination of the action in which it is filed would forbid a separate suit.
These considerations might be expected to induce more frequent claims of
malicious prosecution, and, perhaps, to encourage meretricious counter-
claims filed for their nuisance value alone.' 2 The increased prospect of a
counterclaim may deter a potential plaintiff, who, particularly if he is im-
pecunious or uncertain of his claim, may hesitate to incur the additional
time and expense, and perhaps the need for separate counsel. 13
A more serious threat to the potential plaintiff may result from a general
application of the New York ruling if a court elects to try the issues of the
complaint and counterclaim together, or if separate trial is had without a
jury but before the same judge. An outcome of the complaint issues favora-
ble to the defendant might make easier his task of proving the counterclaim
issues of malice and absence of probable cause. The effect would be to
vitiate the strict standard of proof required of an action for malicious prose-
cution,' 4 making more certain the recovery of damages. These damages are
11. While modern codes permit almost any cause of action to be pleaded as a counter-
claim, some states have older codes which restrict a counterclaim to a cause of action aris-
ing out of the "contract" or out of the "transaction" set forth in the complaint, e.g., "The
counterclaim . . . must be one existing in favor of a defendant and against a plaintiff
between whom a several judgment might be had in the action, and arising out of one of the
following causes of action: 1.) A cause of action arising out of the contract or transaction
set forth in the complaint as the foundation of the plaintiff's claim, or connected with the
subject of the action. 2.) In an action arising on contract, any other cause of action arising
also on contract, and existing at the commencement of the action." N.C. GENa. SrAT. § 1-137
(1943). For an excellent summary see CLARK, CODE PLrEDING, c. 10 (2d ed. 1947). A court
in one of the latter states might view a counterclaim for malicious prosecution as arising out
of a separate transaction, the prior suit itself, and hence disallow it.
12. In the alternative the worm may turn, and the harassed plaintiff bring an action for
malicious prosecution because of the groundless counterclaim. Slee v. Simpson, 91 Colo.
461, 15 P.2d 1084 (1932). Logically, the principle of the New York ruling would permit this
also to be brought in the original action, inviting in turn an additional counterclaim by the
defendant. . . etc., etc.
13. Advice of counsel, acted upon after full and fair disclosure, is a complete defense
to an allegation of lack of probable cause, even if the advice was erroneous. Hall v. Suydam,
6 Barb. 83 (N.Y. 1849); Brodrib v. Doberstein, 107 Conn. 294, 140 Atl. 433 (1928); Anderzon
v. Snell, 57 Nev. 78, 62 P.2d 703 (1936). See Dorr Cattle Co. v. Des 'oine3 Nat. Ban?:,
127 Iowa 153, 98 N.V. 918 (1905); the disclosure must be complete, however, and the ad-
vice must be followed. Hepker v. Schmickle, 209 Iowa 744, 229 N.W. 177 (1930); Note, 21
Mmnm. L. REV. 217 (1937). Convincing proof that full disclosure vas made and that coun-
sel's advice was followed may require that counsel be sworn, making him ineligible to
participate as trial counsel on the issues of the counterclaim. 6 \ViGMORE, Evmwr.cn § 1911
(3d ed. 1940). But .f. Yeager v. Tomich, 68 N.E. 2d 110, 111 (Ohio App. 1945).
14. Malicious prosecution requires cogent proof. Apgar v. Wollston, 43 N.J.L. 57
(18SI); Burt v. Smith, 181 N.Y. 1, 73 N.E. 494 (1905); Lipscomb v. Shofner, 96 Tenn. 112,
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substantial. They may include reimbursement for attorney's fees, compensa-
tion for injuries to credit or reputation, for loss of use of property, or even
for emotional distress,15 and any other damages which can be proved to
have been proximately caused 16 by the malicious suit. If the potentially
large damages of malicious prosecution were to become the usual or even
frequent rather than the exceptional corollary to an ill-fated civil action, a
timid or impecunious plaintiff might well hesitate to sue.
In the United States, at least, bona fide litigants have been protected from
these risks even at the corresponding risk of encouraging groundless suits.
State statutes have minimized the inhibition to potential plaintiffs by
severely limiting the costs which may be immediately recovered by a success-
ful defendant to a civil action.17 And the courts have reinforced this legisla-
tive policy, by holding the action for malicious prosecution in disfavor and
imposing a more stringent burden of proof upon its essential elements-
malice and absence of probable cause."5 The effect is thus to retard both
33 S.W. 818 (1896); Glenn v. Lawrence, 280 Ill. 581, 117 N.E. 757 (1917); GnasN, JUDoGE
AND JuRy 338 (1930). The absence of probable cause ought to be proven with great clarity.
United States Tire Co. v. Irk, 102 Kan. 418, 170 Pac. 811 (1918). The plaintiff in a civil
suit is allowed more latitude than one who institutes criminal proceedings. Pangburn v.
Bull, 1 Wend. 345 (N.Y. 1828). But there are temperate suggestions that courts should not
carry this policy to an extreme which would deny relief to parties harassed with unjustifiable
litigation. Griswold v. Home, 19 Ariz. 56, 165 Pac. 318 (1917); Jaffe v. Stone, 18 Cal. 2d
146, 114 P. 2d 335 (1941).
15. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Miller, 218 Ala. 158, 117 So. 668 (1928) (exemplary
damages for injury to feelings); Weaver v. Page, 6 Cal. 681 (1856) (interference with prop-
erty); Lawrence v. Hagerman, 56 Ill. 68, 8 Am. Rep. 674 (1870) (damage to business and
reputation, loss of customers and credit); Foley v. Union House Furnishing Co., 228 Mo,
App. 1063, 60 S.W. 2d 725 (1933) (injury to person, feelings, and reputation); McInnis v.
Atlantic Investment Corp., 137 Ore. 648, 3 P.2d 118 (1931) (attorney's fees in defending
malicious suit, damages for deprivation of the use of property).
16. Wandell v. Morley, 4 F. Supp. 193 (M.D. Pa. 1933); Carbondale Inv. Co. v. Bur-
dick, 67 Kan. 329, 72 Pac. 781 (1903); Graffagnini v. Shnaider, 1641 La. 1108, 115 So. 287
(1927). It is possible that damage will be presumed when the prior civil suit partakes of a
quasi-criminal character with clearly defamatory implications, e.g., lunacy or bastardy
proceedings. RESTATEMENT, ToRTs § 681, comment c (1938).
17. This is not to say, however, that more liberal cost statutes may not be in order.
Courts have noted their insufficiency. Kolka v. Jones, 6 N.D. 461, 71 N.W. 558 (1897);
Lipscomb v. Shofner, 96 Tenn. 112, 33 S.W. 818 (1896); Closson v. Staples, 42 Vt. 209, 1 Am.
Rep. 316 (1869). Taxable costs cover only a fraction of the expenses of litigation. Counsel
fees and expenses are allowed in only a few restricted types of cases. Typical statutes are:
28 U.S.C. § 1923 (Rev. ed. 1948) (allowing $20 as a docket fee) 17 PuaoN's PA. STAT. § 1635
(1930) (allowing three dollars for prosecuting to a judgment). See McCormick, Counsel
Fees and Other Expenses of Litigation as an Element of Damages, 5 MINN. L. REV. 619 (1931).
In England costs are assessed by special taxing masters, and may include fees paid to
court, to the solicitor, to counsel, and all other necessary expenses. The taxing master
operates within the principles prescribed in the Rules of Court. Attorneys' fees must be
itemized and in most cases the maximum for each item is provided by statute. See Good-
hart, Costs, 38 YALE L.J. 849 (1929).
18. See note 14 supra.
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